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 the U.S. Supreme Court effectively immu-
nized managed-care organizations (MCOs) from li-
ability for negligent decisions about the care of pa-




It found that when MCOs decide to deny benefits,
they are simply applying the terms of an insurance
contract and are not making decisions regarding
the care of patients, even when their decisions are
based on a finding that the care is not medically
necessary. The decision interprets the federal Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),





 It limits the remedies available to the more
than 140 million people under the age of 65 years




 MCOs are responsible only
for the cost of wrongfully denied treatment. Liability
for negligent medical judgment remains almost
exclusively with treating physicians and hospitals.
The cases demonstrate why ERISA, which was orig-
inally enacted in 1974 to protect employee pensions,
is not well suited to protecting patients or their
health benefits today.
Ruby Calad obtained health care coverage through
her husband’s employee group health plan, an
ERISA plan administered by CIGNA HealthCare of
Texas. CIGNA paid for Calad’s hysterectomy, with
rectal, bladder, and vaginal repair. However, CIGNA
authorized payment only for one day in the hospi-
tal, against the recommendation of Calad’s physi-
cian. Calad claimed she could not pay for a longer
stay herself and was discharged. Within days, she
had complications that brought her to the hospital’s
emergency department.
Juan Davila, who has the postpolio syndrome
and diabetes, was enrolled in Aetna U.S. Healthcare
of North Texas, an MCO offered through Davila’s
employer. Davila’s physician recommended that he
take the brand-name drug Vioxx to alleviate severe
pain from rheumatoid arthritis, because it had a
lower incidence of gastrointestinal toxicity than oth-
er arthritis drugs in Aetna’s formulary. Aetna denied
coverage for Vioxx. According to Davila, Aetna’s
prescription-drug formulary precludes a prescrip-
tion for Vioxx unless the patient has a “contraindi-
cation, intolerance, allergy to or a documented ad-





 Therefore, Davila re-
ceived naprosyn, but within a few weeks was taken
to a hospital emergency department, where he re-
ceived seven units of blood for severe internal bleed-





Calad and Davila sued their MCOs under the
Texas Health Care Liability Act, a Texas statute
that holds MCOs liable for negligence when they
fail to exercise ordinary care in making decisions





 CIGNA and Aetna argued that
ERISA preempted the Texas law and that the cases
should be moved from state to federal court. The
MCOs claimed that the plaintiffs were really suing
for denial of insurance benefits, not negligence in
making medical decisions, and that because they
were enrolled in ERISA plans, their only remedy
lay in a lawsuit under ERISA to recover insurance
payments due.
Section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA allows a lawsuit
by a plan participant “to recover benefits due to him
under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights
under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights




When an ERISA plan wrongfully denies benefits to
a participant, Section 502 allows, in essence, a claim
of breach of contract to be brought under the feder-
al law, instead of ordinary state contract law. The
U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted Section 502 as





 It has also suggested that Section 502
prevents the patient from recovering more than the




 In Davila’s case, this
payment would be what Aetna would have paid for
the davila and calad cases




















a Vioxx prescription. In Calad’s case, it would be
what CIGNA would have paid for an additional day
or two in the hospital. Courts have interpreted Sec-
tion 502 to mean that plan participants cannot ob-
tain compensation for any additional financial
losses, such as unpaid medical expenses for the
treatment of problems that arise from denial of the
correct treatment, lost wages resulting from the in-
ability to work, or noneconomic damages to com-




Calad and Davila had sued under Texas law, not
ERISA, because their complaint was with their
MCOs’ choices of medical care, and ERISA offered
no compensation for personal injury. ERISA was en-
acted to protect employees from losing their pen-
sions as a result of inadequate funding or misman-





ineffective state laws with a single federal regulato-





 Employees who are wrongfully denied
pension benefits in the form of monthly cash pay-
ments can be fully compensated for that harm
(“made whole”) by receiving the dollars denied. In
contrast, denying health benefits in the form of
medical care can result in physical as well as finan-
cial harm. ERISA’s remedy of a cash benefit reim-
bursement may have suited traditional indemnity
health insurance plans, but it proved ill suited for
managed care. In the 1990s, courts began to distin-
guish between the types of decisions that MCOs
made to determine whether they should be held





 Decisions about patient care were gen-
erally considered medical judgments that could




whereas decisions about benefit coverage were
viewed as contract decisions that could be chal-














 the Supreme Court clas-
sified decisions made by MCOs and physicians into
three categories. Eligibility decisions determined
whether an insurance contract covered a particular
medical condition or therapy. Treatment decisions
were medical judgments about “how to go about di-
agnosing and treating a patient’s condition.” Mixed
decisions were described as “when-and-how” de-
cisions, in which benefit coverage depended on the
type of treatment needed, such as inpatient hospi-




 dealt with the separate
claim of fiduciary duties, it led to speculation about
whether the Supreme Court expected that claims of
negligent treatment and mixed decisions should
be heard in state courts under state malpractice law,










clude that Davila and Calad’s claims involved mixed





preme Court rejected that conclusion.
In a unanimous decision written by Justice Clarence
Thomas, the Supreme Court held that Section 502
of the act provides the “exclusive” remedy for pa-
tients in ERISA plans when an MCO denies bene-
fits — even if the denial is based on a decision that
the disputed care is not medically necessary for the
particular patient. The Court said, “If an individual,
at some point in time, could have brought his claim
under ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(B), and where there
is no other independent legal duty that is implicated
by a defendant’s actions, then the individual’s cause





 The Court rejected the patients’
argument that the Texas law created an independent
legal duty — that of making medical decisions with
ordinary care. Ultimately, it found, everything turns
on whether the health plan covers the treatment
sought. MCOs, like other insurers, owe patients
only what the contract covers. The MCO would not
be legally responsible for denying care that the con-
tract excluded, no matter what happened to the pa-
tient, because it had no contractual duty to provide
that care in the first place. Therefore, it is always
necessary to determine whether the contract covers
the disputed treatment before deciding whether the
MCO made the wrong treatment decision. This
means that decisions by MCOs about what kind of
care to pay for must be regarded as eligibility or ben-
efit determinations, not treatment decisions.
The Court then found that since ERISA provided
a federal remedy for benefit denials, Davila and Cal-





though the text of Section 502 says nothing about
preempting state law, the Court concluded that giv-
ing members of ERISA plans recourse to remedies
under state law would conflict with Congress’s in-
tent to create a comprehensive federal regulatory
scheme for employee benefit plans under ERISA.
Thus, patients who challenge an MCO’s determi-
nation that a treatment is not medically necessary
are limited to a Section 502 claim. If they ultimately
win, the most they can recover is the dollar amount
of the insurance payment for the care they were de-
the supreme court’s  decision
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nied — such as extra inpatient days or a prescription
for Vioxx. (Calad and Davila had elected to pursue
their appeal to the Supreme Court instead of filing
a claim under Section 502 and therefore recovered
nothing.)
The Court left open the possibility that patients





employer typically designates a person or company
to be its ERISA plan fiduciary. But others are also
deemed to be fiduciaries if they have “any discre-
tionary authority or discretionary responsibility in





said that MCOs would be considered fiduciaries if
they made final benefit-coverage decisions that were
binding on the ERISA plan — even when the deci-





 But this simply confirmed that MCOs can
be sued for benefit denials. Few wrongful benefit
denials amount to a breach of fiduciary duty, which





 Moreover, in the case of such a breach, the





 Thus, these alternatives do not compen-
sate the patient for personal injury.
Under ERISA Section 502(a)(3), patients can sue
for a breach of other fiduciary duties or a violation




 However, the Court
has said that persons cannot obtain money damag-




 In a concurring opin-
ion, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg suggested that
the Court could reinterpret the remedy offered by
Section 502(a)(3) of the act to include “make-
whole” relief, which would provide some compen-




 Only Justice Stephen G.
Breyer joined her opinion, however, which sug-






 was decided, the president of the
American Medical Association was quoted as say-
ing, “This is a sad day for America’s patients and the





nizations fear that the decision will encourage





 They worry that MCOs will have
little incentive to make medically appropriate deci-
sions if the only penalty for wrongful conduct is no
more than what they should have paid in the first
place.
Most state insurance laws authorize “bad faith”
lawsuits for just that reason. Insurers who deny valid





 Such damages are intended to counter-
balance any financial incentive for insurers to force
claimants to sue when there is no bona fide reason












 the Supreme Court ruled that
ERISA preempts the remedy of punitive damages
under state law for improper processing of benefit




 The Court re-









did not address the incentive effects of available
remedies.




 liability laws in
all states — whether in the form of legislation or of
common law — cannot be used to hold MCOs lia-
ble for causing personal injury to patients in ERISA
plans when their actions are taken as part of a ben-
efit-coverage decision. The only medical judgments
that are subject to state liability law are those made
by treating physicians. The only legal mechanism
for enforcing an MCO’s obligation to pay for treat-
ment is a lawsuit brought under ERISA. In theory, it
remains possible to hold MCOs vicariously liable for
medical malpractice committed by treating physi-





ability of MCOs would depend on proof of the





practice, however, MCOs rarely employ physicians
to treat patients or authorize them to act as their
agents.
In 2002, the Court found that states may require
that MCOs submit to independent external review to




In addition, U.S. Department of Labor regulations





 If an MCO fails to abide by an ex-





prevents participants in ERISA plans from using
state law to enforce the decision. This may dilute
the effect of independent-review laws enacted in
42 states and the District of Columbia.
The Court emphasized that ERISA gave Davila





could have challenged the MCOs’ decisions when
they were first made or paid for the care they wanted
and then sued for reimbursement. The ruling thus
creates an incentive for patients to challenge every
MCO decision they disagree with. However, such
remedies may prove illusory. Many patients cannot
pay for expensive treatment out-of-pocket in the
hope of future reimbursement, and few patients




















have the physical or emotional energy to pursue a
challenge when they are sick. More important, pa-
tients may not realize that there are grounds for ap-
peal unless their physicians tell them that there are.
Physicians’ ethical and legal obligation to explain all





 Patients may also expect that their
physicians will help them appeal MCO denials of
recommended treatment. Physicians should be pre-
pared at least to substantiate their recommenda-
tions. At the same time, they should resist pressure
to recommend anything they believe to be medically
inappropriate.
Today, MCOs are squeezed by rising health care









 may encourage MCOs to
adopt more restrictive agreements with physicians
in order to discourage them from recommending




 If physicians complied
without justification, MCOs would increasingly de-
fine the boundaries of medical judgment. Moreover,
real or presumed conflicts of interest stemming
from financial arrangements between MCOs and





 Alternatively, MCOs could transfer
more medical decision making to patients and phy-
sicians. A growing number of consumer-choice
plans adopt the latter approach for a significant




 Some plans allow pa-
tients to buy care up to a certain dollar amount di-
rectly from physicians without approval from the
MCO, thereby insulating the MCO from any respon-
sibility for injury of patients. Such plans mimic the
division between benefit decisions and medical care
that existed before the advent of managed care. Af-
ter spending the designated amount, however, pa-
tients are likely to confront the same benefit deci-
sions based on medical-necessity determinations





The Court clarified the division between federal
and state jurisdiction over MCOs serving ERISA
plans. A decade of Supreme Court decisions nar-
rowed the scope of the Section 514 preemption in
ERISA and allowed the states to regulate insurers





 But the Court remains convinced that
ERISA requires a single, unified approach under fed-
eral law to disputes over benefits.
 
8 The Court em-
phasized its conclusion that ERISA was enacted to
“ensure that employee benefit plan regulation would
be ‘exclusively a federal concern.’”1 Thus, whereas
states can regulate the terms of insurance contracts,
they cannot provide patients in ERISA plans with
remedies for a violation of that contract. This divi-
sion may make it easy for courts to decide who is li-
able for what, but it fails to address the legitimate
concerns of patients and physicians who seek high-
quality care in a system that encompasses a variety
of health plans. 
By excluding ERISA plans from the jurisdiction
of state laws governing liability, the Supreme Court
decision continues the patchwork system of health
care in the United States. The rights of patients and
their physicians depend on the particular statute
that governs their health care plan, whether that
plan is Medicare, Medicaid, a military program, the
Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, a state
benefit program for government employees, or an
individually purchased health insurance policy. The
impetus for the federal Bipartisan Patient Protec-
tion bills passed but not enacted in 2001 stemmed
largely from dissatisfaction with the differential
treatment of participants in ERISA plans and peo-
ple in other health care plans.64,65 The resistance of
MCOs to liability encouraged a growing consumer
backlash, because it suggested that MCOs were
unwilling to accept accountability for their deci-
sions.66-69 The Supreme Court’s ruling in Davila
may renew pressure for federal reform.
In her concurring opinion in Davila, Justice Gins-
burg said she joined “the rising judicial chorus urg-
ing that Congress and [this] Court revisit what is an
unjust and increasingly tangled ERISA regime.”70,71
ERISA could be amended in one of three ways to
solve the intractable dispute over MCO liability.18
The preemption of state liability law could be elim-
inated to give states exclusive jurisdiction over
claims of personal injury brought by patients against
MCOs as well as providers. Alternatively, ERISA
could be amended to grant patients “make whole”
compensation for personal injury. A third approach
is to divide jurisdiction for personal-injury claims,
with claims based on medical judgment, including
claims that coverage for medically necessary treat-
ment was denied, subject to state law, whereas pure
eligibility or financial claims remain subject to
ERISA. The first option is consistent with tradition-
al principles of federalism and provides the greatest
uniformity. The second is consistent with keeping
ERISA plans as a separate group governed only by
federal law. The third is a compromise, allowing
separate, uniform administration of ERISA plans
under federal law while preserving state regulation
of health care quality and some insurance functions.
n engl j med 351;13 www.nejm.org september 23, 2004
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In 2001, the Bush administration supported the sec-
ond approach but then opposed liability in an am-
icus curiae brief supporting the insurers in Davila.
This opposition suggests that the administration
will not initiate reforms on its own.
The Davila decision embodies a dichotomous view
of health benefit plans, in which insurers adminis-
ter contracts and physicians make medical judg-
ments. In this view, insurers are responsible only
for payments defined by contract, whereas treating
physicians are responsible for the consequences of
medical choices. In reality, the world is messier.
MCOs and physicians share financial pressures to
cut costs and improve quality. But MCOs will not
share the physicians’ responsibility for negligent
decisions about the care of patients in ERISA plans.
Davila also highlights the variation in laws gov-
erning different types of health plans. Physicians
and patients have the same goals for treatment, re-
gardless of who pays the bill or which statute ap-
plies. Congress should amend ERISA to ensure that
ERISA plans and their MCOs are just as accountable
to patients for medical decisions as physicians are.
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